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Please, Please, Please Let Me Get What I Want": Institutional Survival, Political Unrest, and Concessions.

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Abstract;

Why do some governments resort to providing concessions to dissident challenges whereas other governments resist giving in to their demands? Political unrest occurs throughout the world regardless of government type; however, some governments concede to concessions while others remain steadfastly against acquiescence. Prior literature provide significant understanding on state repression but less progress has been produced on when regimes give in to dissident demands. To provide a theoretical explanation, I argue that the ability of certain authoritarian regimes to survive after reforms lead to institutional change and the perceived threat of the political unrest are the key concepts that influences the decision of the regime to provide concessions or resist any form of change. Using the NAVCO dataset, I use a direct effects model to represent a nonviolent protest campaign and an interactions model to simulate a violent dissident challenge. I find that regimes such as single party and military regimes are more likely to provide concessions to violent campaigns whereas monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to give in to reforms if the campaigns remain nonviolent.

Keywords Protests, concessions, authoritarian regimes, repression

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Introduction

Why do some governments resort to providing concessions to dissident challenges whereas other governments resist giving in to the demands? The "Arab Spring" of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrated a powerful expression of discontent from the populations of numerous Arab countries against their respective governments. Sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on December 19, 2010, the mass movements continued to diffuse throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Brownlee et al., 2015). To counter the potential upheavals, governments in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait provided economic and infrastructure concessions to their populations. The monarchy in Saudi Arabia publicly proclaimed that the crown would provide $130 billion for salary increases, housing creation, and other projects on the night before a scheduled mass protest. Abu Dhabi promised to pay $1.6 billion for housing loans to individual citizens in the UAE while the Bahrain and Kuwait governments increased social provisions by providing monetary concessions to individual families. Finally, Qatar publicly declared $8 billion spending for wage and salary benefits for state and military personnel (Abouzzohour, 2021). Consequently, the economic concessions provided by these governments satisfied the potential dissidents within their respective countries and protests failed to occur. Conversely, we observed countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya resist the desires of the dissidents and ultimately evolved into civil war.

The Arab Spring illustrates an interesting research puzzle: *What accounts for the diversity of regime responses to protests and outcomes to these state-society clashes? Why do targeted regimes react to mass dissent by offering reform? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest?*

This article introduces and tests a theory regarding the driving factors influencing a regime's response to mass protest. I argue that this process is influenced by two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perceived threat posed by the political unrest to the continued survival of the regime. I use several logit models to test the proposed relationship regarding why a regime selects a particular response to political unrest and offer an analysis of these results. I find support for my contention that certain regimes such as single party and military regimes will react to dissident challenges with concessions if the challenge is violent whereas other regimes such as monarchies and personalist regimes will respond with concessions only if the campaign remains nonviolent.

Literature Review

The Arab Spring demonstrates that when a regime faces domestic political unrest, it may respond in various methods: continue with the status quo or tolerating and ignoring the protest campaign (Bishara, 2015; Yuen & Cheng, 2017), concessions through policy changes, concessions through monetary goods, regime change or reform, or repress the opposition (Conrad, 2011; de Vogel, 2024; Franklin, 2009; Leuschner & Hellmeier, 2024; Pinckney, 2018; Ryckman, 2016). In comparison to facing armed conflict such as civil war, the regime possesses more response options to nonviolent dissent such as various methods of repression or acquiescence in the form of concessions such as monetary payoffs, policy reform, or others (Bishara, 2015; de Vogel, 2024; Eck, 2015; Eck et al., 2021; Hutter & Vliegenthart, 2018; McAlexander & Ricart-Huguet, 2021; Tertytchnaya, 2023; Vullers & Schwarz, 2018; Wouters & Walgrave, 2017; Yuen & Cheng, 2017).

Literature on contentious politics has made progress toward understanding the interactions between dissidents and the regime through the emphasis on a dynamic relationship between the types of political unrest or the dissent-repression nexus (Carey, 2006; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, 2000; Rasler, 1996). Many studies approach the relationship between dissidents and regimes by concentrating on the micro-level processes of tactical maneuvers between belligerents and how their actions influence each other. Some studies have argued for a reciprocal relationship between belligerents as one actor will respond in kind to the initial behavior regardless of violence or acquiescence or possibly alternate between violent and nonviolent tactics (Cunningham et al., 2017; Cunningham et al., 2020; Ives & Lewis, 2020; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, 2000; Rasler, 1996; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021). Further, the dynamic interaction between the actors may evolve in nonlinear fashion as political unrest may induce government concessions or government repression may break the will of the dissidents and push them to deescalate and possibly demobilize (Cunningham et al., 2017; Cunningham et al., 2020; Ives & Lewis, 2020; Lichbach, 1987; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021).

The repression literature also made advancements in determining which government types are more likely to repress their population and under which conditions. Poe et al. (1999) found that democracies are less likely than autocracies to repress oppositional challenges. Davenport (2007a) argues for a "tyrannical peace", finding that single party regimes are less likely to repress their population than other autocratic regime types. Furthermore, he notes that military regimes are less repressive than other autocracies with civil liberties violations but more repressive regarding physical integrity violations (Davenport, 1995, 2007a). Democracies, conversely, are less likely to repress their population than any regime type (Davenport, 1996, 2007b; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Davenport & Inman, 2012; Poe et al., 1999).

Studies also demonstrate the effect of the past on future regime behaviors. Previous experiences with repression increase the probability of the regime employing similar methods in the future (Carey, 2010; Davenport, 1995, 1996; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Josua & Edel, 2015; Poe et al., 1999; Rost, 2011). Moreover, the literature's most consistent finding concerns the regime's threat perception and its subsequent response. If the regime perceives an escalation in threat to its survival, it is highly likely that it will respond with repression (Davenport, 2007b; Earl, 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Ives & Lewis, 2020; Josua & Edel, 2015; Klein & Regan, 2018; Onursal et al., 2024; Ortmann, 2023; Poe et al., 1999; Regan & Henderson, 2002). Conversely, violence also serves as an stimulus for dissident movements as state repression commonly pushes dissidents to adopt violence as a strategy (Belgoioso, 2018; Chenoweth et al., 2017; Dornschneider-Elkink & Henderson, 2023; Pinckney, 2018; Ives & Lewis, 2020; Murdie & Purser, 2017; Lupu & Wallace, 2019; Ryckman 2020; Wasow, 2020; Zhu et al., 2022).

These noted studies produced significant results in understanding the dynamic relationship between belligerents as well as regime repression. However, they do not solve why the regime chooses a particular alternative when faced with rising dissent. Earlier studies contributed pieces of the puzzle regarding a regime response to political unrest, and when governments repress dissidents, but we are lacking a comprehensive theory to understand this phenomenon. I fill this gap by arguing that the decision of a regime to repress or accommodate is influenced by the interaction between the perceived level of threat posed by the political unrest and the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment.

Theory

In all government types, the primary concern of the leader is institutional survival or to gain control of the government and maintain authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). While democratic governments impose term limits on their leaders, nondemocratic leaders typically attempt to extend their control of power for a longer period through various strategies. As noted above, when faced with a challenge, direct or perceived, to the continuous political power of the government through political unrest, the leader will likely respond in one of several manners: repression, toleration or ignoring the unrest, or concessions.

Leaders respond to political unrest to maintain the status quo and ensure the survivability of the institution. The regime acts to increase the risks and costs of participation, deter the political unrest, and retain power. If the regime represses dissidents, it is a strategic maneuver to suppress the opposition by increasing the costs of political unrest by introducing the costs associated with repression. Similarly, if the regime offers reform through concessions to the dissidents, the response represents a method of quelling the disruption by increasing the costs of protesting as they may lose potential benefits gained through concessions. In the end, both regime responses are selected to impede the opposition and preserve the status quo.

If all possible responses are chosen for the same reason, why does one regime opt for one response while another regime selects a different response? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest? Two concepts help clarify this process: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perception of threat posed by the political unrest to the continued survival of the institution.

The Probability of Institutional Survival in a Post-Reform Environment

I begin with the assumption that all governments, democratic and nondemocratic, require the support of a selectorate and a winning coalition to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). A leader comes into office and commonly preserves her position through a patron-client relationship or the continued support of a specific group of advocates or winning coalition whose backing allow continued rule. In return for continued support, the leader provides benefits to members of the winning coalition to survive politically. In democracies, the winning coalition is significantly large as all eligible voters may influence an election, but with a large winning coalition, it is too expensive to procure support through private payoffs. Therefore, the leader provides public goods to gain public support. These benefits are nonexclusive and nonrival, regardless of their contributions to production of public goods or their support of the regime. Conversely, an autocracy distributes benefits in a selective or exclusive manner through private goods to members of its winning coalition such as monetary payments, contracts, or monopolies over certain elements of the economy. The leader only provides private goods to those essential to maintaining her control of political power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) concentrate on the individual leader's survival and how she ensures her continued survival in power by providing public and private benefits. This study, however, argues that a regime's specific institutional framework provides the necessary protection for the survival of the leader. Significant differences exist between types of authoritarian regimes, which may permit the leader to remain in power despite changes in the political environment. Alternatively, other authoritarian regimes possess the institutional attributes to retain political power in the current institutional framework; however, the leader is vulnerable and likely to lose power if the political institution is altered. While Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explicitly refrain from a categorical focus on types of political systems, there are significant differences in the size of the winning coalition based on the type of the political institution (Heger & Salehyan, 2007). Geddes (1999) disaggregates regime type by classifying non-democratic regimes into the categories of military regimes, personalist regimes, single-party regimes, and hybrid regimes. Wright (2008) also contributes to this discussion by identifying monarchies as a separate regime type, which may also produce diverse effects and traits compared to other autocracies.

Each autocratic regime type has different winning coalition sizes, which influences the decision-making of the leader, particularly the regime's response to contentious opposition. I argue that the regime's winning coalition influences the leader's decision-making through the costs and costliness of the decision. The decision is first influenced by the costs of the response, which subsequently affects the amount of private funds that the leader possesses to satisfy the members of the winning coalition. Repression, policy concessions, and monetary concessions have direct and indirect monetary costs to implement the response. Second, the decision of the leader must account for the costliness of the regime response. Similar to the costs of the regime response, the leader is primarily concerned with institutional survival, the deterrence of political unrest, and how the specific response could influence the loss of power. The costliness of the response is based on the costs associated with the response by the regime. If the regime response significantly reduces the private funds to pay off the winning coalition by increasing coalition membership or by using the funds to respond to political unrest, the coalition members may shift loyalty to an opposing contender or become the opposition themselves as they perceive gaining more benefits by switching allegiance. Thus, the leader must retain a significant amount of private funds and the continued loyalty of the winning coalition members to guarantee regime stability. While each type of regime response has similarly associated costs across institutions, the type of institution influences response cost through the winning coalition's size.

Authoritarian regimes have smaller winning coalitions than democracies. However, they demonstrate significant differences, particularly regarding the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment. All responses to political unrest are conducted to ensure the survival of the institution against the possibility of reform of the government. If the regime succumbs to political unrest and undergoes reform, the current regime type may be modified and the survival of the former leader in the new government will likely be threatened. However, regime type influences the probability that the current administration will survive in the post-reform environment.

Single party regimes are political institutions controlled by the country's dominant party. While other political parties may exist, the dominant party retains exclusive control of the leadership, distribution of benefits, advancement within the government and bureaucracy, and policymaking (Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014a; Geddes et al., 2018; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Kailitz, 2015; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Wahman et al., 2013). Within single party regimes, the leader is less politically insulated from the population and the winning coalition is larger compared to monarchies and personalist regimes. With the party controlling access to advancement and policymaking, it is not the leader controlling the regime but rather the political party and its membership. Therefore, if the regime responds to dissent with concessions and the winning coalition consequently expands,

the individual member of the winning coalition does not lose as many benefits compared to a winning coalition member in a personalist regime or monarchy.

While the winning coalition in a single party regime is smaller than a democracy, there is a significant difference between single party regimes and other authoritarian regimes. In single party regimes, the country is accustomed to a political party managing the government and the political power within the regime does not surround one leader. Thus, if reform occurs in a single-party regime, the former ruling administration may survive as the party can participate in the new political environment. The former ruling party becomes a viable political party in a multi-party electoral system and competes with other political parties for policymaking influence and government control.

Military regimes also have a significant likelihood of surviving after reform. *Military regimes* are political institutions where a small group of officers control the regime and conduct policymaking. The officers comprise the winning coalition and access to the regime is severely limited. Unlike single party regimes, they do not allow for elections to gain political influence, which permits insulation from the mass population (Albrecht & Ohl, 2016; Clapham & Philip, 2021; Davenport, 2007a; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Geddes et al., 2014a; Geddes et al., 2018; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Kailitz, 2015; Kim, 2018; Wahman et al., 2013).

Winning coalitions within military regimes retain exclusive control over the security apparatus and are highly proficient in employing violence; thus, the literature is divided on whether they are more likely to engage in repression when faced with political unrest (Davenport, 2007a; Poe et al., 1999; Svolik, 2013) or refrain from using violence (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014b). Moreover, military regimes differ from regime types with smaller winning coalitions such as personalist regimes and monarchies. Typically, leaders of military regimes are not career politicians and are more concerned with the survival of the military, national security, the maintenance of domestic order, and military autonomy from civilian influence (Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014b). Military regimes often concentrate on salvaging social and political order rather than the survival of the military regime itself. When faced with a post-reform environment, the military junta governing the regime can survive as their authority is not contingent on remaining in political power; instead, those leading a military regime can focus exclusively on military affairs (Geddes et al., 2014b). Therefore, the leader, the winning coalition, and the military itself will survive in a post-reform environment.

In contrast, personalist regimes and monarchies have smaller winning coalitions concentrating solely on the leader herself, thus operating differently in a post-reform environment. *Personalist regimes* are political institutions where the individual leader controls all aspects of the state, including the political and security apparatuses. Although the personalist leader may be a part of the military or head of a political party, she controls all aspects of the regime while the military and/or political party has no autonomous influence over policymaking. Furthermore, she relies on political patronage to gain control over political power and to ensure that her institution survives (Chin et al., 2022; Colgan & Weeks, 2015; Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014a; Geddes et al., 2018; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Kendall-Taylor et al., 2017; Van den Bosch, 2015). To retain power, she depends on a small winning coalition to provide support. In exchange for loyalty, she uses private payoffs to coalition members. A personalist regime remains politically insulated from the population as the winning coalition is very small and the leader controls all aspects of the regime.

Monarchies, are political institutions controlled exclusively by a monarch and her ruling family (Bischof & Fink 2015; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014a; Geddes et al., 2018; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Jugl, 2020; Korotayev & Khokhlova, 2022; Moller, 2019; Wahman et al., 2013). I argue that monarchies are similar to personalist regimes as the monarch and the royal family comprise the winning coalition and the mass population has little to no opportunity for influence. Therefore, the winning coalition is commonly small and the leader remains insulated from the mass population.

Furthermore, monarchies and personalist regimes are parallel in the manner that the regime type is constructed. In both, the leader is the center of political authority and a small winning coalition provides the essential political insulation from the mass population. If the state undertakes reform, I argue that both monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to survive than military or single party regimes. Like single party regimes, monarchies and personalist regimes both wish to survive and remain in power; however, they cannot evolve to survive in the new environment. Unlike military regimes, they cannot retreat back to the barracks and it is unlikely that they will transform into a competitive political party like former single party regimes. In monarchies and personalist regimes, the main source of a leader's power resides in controlling all aspects of the government and an accompanying small winning coalition to provide protection for the leader from the population in exchange for private benefits (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). However, in a post-reform environment, monarchs and personalist leaders no longer possess the monetary funds or political power for private payoffs to satisfy the winning coalition and consequently, political insulation from the population. Concessions and reforms would likely destroy the foundation that both regime types depend upon for survival. Therefore, it is unlikely that the former administration in monarchies and personalist regimes will survive in a post-reform environment.

Perceived Threat Posed by the Political Unrest

Previous research demonstrates that while the regime type and capacity are important in understanding regime response to political unrest, the nature and level of the perceived threat produced by dissident activity influences

regime response (Davenport, 1995, 2007b; Regan & Henderson, 2002). Whether political unrest presents a significant threat to institutional survival affects how the regime responds to dissent. If dissident activity is significantly threatening, there is high likelihood that the regime will respond with repression (Davenport, 1995, 2007b; Earl, 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Josua & Edel, 2015; Poe et al., 1999; Regan & Henderson, 2002). Davenport (2007b) terms this relationship as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness". Thus, the characteristics of political unrest, specifically the nature and level of threat are important to understanding the response of the regime to the contentious challenge.

Violent campaigns targeting the regime are more likely to be perceived as a considerable challenge to the current regime's rule than nonviolent campaigns. Once dissidents escalate to violence, this reduces options for the regime and is forced to react either through concessions, reform, or repression. This may influence the regime to respond to the violence in kind with repression of the campaign as they represent a significant threat to regime survival (Ives & Lewis, 2020; Josua & Edel, 2015; Klein & Regan, 2018; Onursal et al., 2024; Ortmann, 2023; Sika, 2023).

If political unrest remains nonviolent, the decision to violently repress the dissidents could backfire as the regime may lose citizen support and incite them to mobilize against the regime (Chenoweth & Shock, 2015; Dahlum et al., 2023; Gutting, 2020; Lizzo-Wilson et al., 2022; Orazani & Leidner, 2019; Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019; Simpson et al., 2018; Wasow, 2020). Moreover, the international community may respond to this behavior through punitive repercussions targeting the regime (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Consequently, the regime may determine that providing concessions to the dissidents is a less costly response.

Through the discussion of the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perceived threat posed by the political unrest, I derive four hypotheses to explain regime decision making when faced with political unrest targeted at the regime.[1]

Hypotheses

H1: *When faced with a high threat from dissidents, single party and military regimes are more likely to provide concessions than monarchies and personalist regimes.*

H2: *When faced with a low threat from dissidents, single party and military regimes are less likely to provide concessions than monarchies and personalist regimes.*

H3: *When faced with a high threat from dissidents, monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to provide concessions than single party and military regimes.*

H4: *When faced with a low threat from dissidents, monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to provide concessions than single party and military regimes.*

Material and Methods

Statistical Model

To address my research questions, I construct a dataset of political challenges to the continued rule of a regime by a dissident opposition. The specific cases selected for the dataset are identified as "regime crises" where political unrest challenges the current political regime's tenure. There have been thousands of protests throughout history; however, a regime in power does not always respond to all types of protests. Further, this study's theory attempts to explain why regimes respond in a particular manner to political unrest directed at the regime. Therefore, while numerous examples of dissent may be directed at some facet of society, the campaigns selected in this dataset must be directed at the continued survival of the current regime and must present a crisis to the regime[2]. I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset (N.A.V.C.O. 1.1), a cross-sectional dataset with the unit of analysis of the political campaign itself from 1945 to 2006, to select the observations of political unrest for this study.

Dependent Variable

To capture the regime response, I created a measure of the successful achievement of the protest campaign's desired reform. While this study concentrates on determining what factors influence a regime to provide

[1] Prior studies on the microprocesses of conflict noted that a regime may use both repression and concessions simultaneously when faced with a dissident challenge through political unrest (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, 2000; Rasler, 1996). As noted above, this work assumes that the regime leader is a rational actor who operates in a manner to ensure their continued survival. Thus, this action is a strategic action by the regime to suppress the political unrest through the suppression of the dissidents through force or the provision of certain concessions. Despite these expectations, I do not test for this relationship in this study as the data and information does not exist in the dataset.

[2] The inclusion criteria are outlined in the codebook for the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset (N.A.V.C.O. 1.1). Specifically, Chenoweth (2011) notes that the protest campaign must be directed at the regime, have a political objective, and present a challenge to the government.

concessions to dissidents, I use a proxy measure of the successful attainment of dissident goals to measure the dependent variable.[3]

The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset provides three dichotomous measures of the outcome/successfulness of the protest campaign: *success*, *limited*, and *failure*.[4] The *success* variable is a dichotomous variable noting whether the protest campaign gained all of its stated goals while the *limited* variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the dissidents secured at least some of its prescribed goals (Chenoweth, 2011). From this data, I created the dichotomous dependent variable, *success_limit*, which measures "1" if the protest campaign gained all its stated goals (*success*) or if it gained some of its goals (*limited*). On the other hand, the variable measures "0" if the campaign failed to gain its stated goals. With a dichotomous dependent variable, I use a logit model in order to test my theory concerning the determinants of a regime response to political unrest.

Primary Independent Variables

In operationalizing the first concept of my theory (*institutional survival in a post-reform environment*), I use four variables representing authoritarian regime types from the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (Geddes et al., 2014a): *single party regime*, *military regime*, *personalist regime*, and *monarchy*.[5] Each variable is dichotomous, measuring "1" if the institution in power in a country demonstrated traits of the particular regime type during the year and "0" otherwise. Thus, if a country is considered a single party in a particular year, the *single party* variable measures "1" and all other regime type variables are "0". I expect that single party and military regimes will act similarly when faced with a threatening campaign while personalist regimes and monarchies will act in a related manner when faced with a significant threat from a protest campaign.

My theory's second concept concentrates on the regime's threat perception so a variable is included to account for whether the dissident group represents a high or low threat. I incorporate a dichotomous variable, violence (*viol*), which represents whether the dissidents primarily engaged in violence against the regime during the protest campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Many protest campaigns alternate between violent and nonviolent strategies and other campaigns have violent factions simultaneously with nonviolent factions (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, 2000; Rasler, 1996); however, this variable emphasizes whether the protest campaign primarily used violent strategies.

As my theory argues that the determination of a regime response to a challenge stems from an interaction between two concepts, my third independent variable (*regime*viol*) represents the interaction between the first two independent variables. I generate four interaction variables representing the probability of institutional survival (regime type) and whether the challenge represents a high or low threat to the regime (*violence*). When I test the hypotheses, I drop one of the regime type variables and its corresponding interaction term to provide a baseline of comparison between the specific regime and the other regime types. I expect that the regime response to political unrest changes in the proposed manner once they are exposed to the threat by dissident violence.

Control Variables

To isolate the effect of other influences on regime response, I include four control variables. First, a country's ethnic fractionalization (*ef*) is controlled for as the ethnic composition of a country may affect the likelihood of political violence (Thurber, 2018, 2021). The variable ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the probability of two random people within a country being from the same ethnic or religious group.

Second, the control variable (*lnpop*) represents the logged population of the country from the final year of the protest campaign. This variable is measured by the Penn World Tables 6.2 and gained from the N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Third, I also incorporate control variables that represent the characteristics of the protest campaign. The log of members (*lmembers*) represents the magnitude of the dissident group (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). A large number of people participating in a protest campaign decreases the risk of individuals suffering participation costs (arrest, injury, or death) and stimulates others to join to gain future benefits (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022; Chenoweth & Belgoioso, 2019; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021). Therefore, large protest campaign participation may be highly threatening and represent a significant challenge to the regime.

Fourth, as N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 is not a time series dataset, I account for the element of time by including a variable measuring the logged duration of the campaign (*lduration*). This is measured in days and is provided by

[3] The logic behind this coding decision is the assumption that with the successful attainment of dissident goals, the regime provided the dissidents with some form of concessions or reform that would satisfy the demands of the protest campaign.

[4] The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset also provides an ordinal variable *Outcome*, which measures the level of success of the protest campaign ranging from failure to limited to successful gain of the prescribed goals of the protest campaign.

[5] The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset includes forty-two democracies, twenty-three colonies, and five warlord governments. They are excluded as I rely on the four authoritarian regime types noted above.

N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). It has been demonstrated that the duration of the protest campaign influences the outcome of the campaign (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Table 1: Logistic Regression: Probability of Concessions to Dissidents (Direct Effects)

Variable	Model 1: Military as Baseline	Model 2: Personalist as Baseline	Model 3: Single Party as Baseline	Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline
Military Regime	---	-0.748	0.028	-0.128
		(.603)	(.582)	(.679)
Personalist Regime	1.036 **	---	1.075 **	0.940
	(.515)		(.495)	(.575)
Single Party regime	-0.081	-0.802	---	-0.190
	(.563)	(.563)		(.642)
Monarchy Regime	0.247	-0.480	0.292	---
	(.888)	(.890)	(.869)	
Violence	-1.754 ***	-1.801***	-1.739 ***	-1.761 ***
	(.586)	(.600)	(.583)	(.598)
Members (Log)	0.211	0.235	0.209	0.220
	(.130)	(.133)	(.128)	(.127)
Duration (Log)	0.199	0.193	0.196	0.203
	(.159)	(.171)	(.158)	(.161)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.645	0.688	0.652	0.642
	(.846)	(.854)	(.846)	(.851)
Population (Log)	-0.352 **	-0.373 ***	-0.352**	-0.355 **
	(.149)	(.141)	(.150)	(.148)
N	117	117	117	117
Goodness of Fit	0.3637	0.3528	0.3613	0.3672

(***) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level

(**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level

ǂ The dependent variable of concessions is created from the *success* and *limited* outcome variables found in the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) Dataset (Chenoweth, 2011).

ǂǂ Goodness of Fit test: Prob> chi2

Results and Discussion

Table 1 presents the results of the four logit regressions. In each of the four models, the baseline of comparison is changed. I drop one of the four regime type variables as well as the corresponding interaction variable. The omitted regime type serves as the baseline of comparison for the other variables in the model. Therefore, each model's results are interpreted in comparison to the particular omitted regime type. To determine the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, I also include the predicted probabilities of the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean (Pitblado et al., 2024)[6] in Tables 2 and 4.

In the first four models listed in Table 1, we observe the direct effects of the independent variables without the interactions between concepts proposed in the theory. The results of these models demonstrate how authoritarian regimes respond to dissident opposition, which remained nonviolent throughout the political unrest.

[6] To determine the predicted probabilities of the particular variable, I use the command, *prchange*, which calculates the marginal and discrete change for the coefficients. In order to isolate the effect of the specific regime type (probability of post-reform survival) and the corresponding interaction term, I hold all of the control variables at their mean and the other regime type variables at zero.

In the second group of four models listed in Table 3, we observe the effects of the independent variables with the interactions noted above. I introduce

four interactions within these models. These results permit us to observe the regime's response to a dissident violent challenge targeting the leader's tenure.

Table 2: Marginal Effects of the Logit Models (Direct Effects)

Variable	Model 1: *Military as Baseline*	Model 2: *Personalist as Baseline*	Model 3: *Single Party as Baseline*	Model 4: *Monarchy as Baseline*
Single Party Regime	-0.02 (-0.29- 0.25)	-0.20 (-0.47- 0.08)	-----	-0.05 (-0.36- 0.26)
Military Regime	-----	-0.18 (-0.48- 0.11)	0.01 (-0.27- 0.29)	-0.03 (-0.36- 0.30)
Monarchy Regime	0.06 (-0.37- 0.49)	-0.12 (-0.55- 0.31)	0.07 (-0.35- 0.49)	-----
Personalist Regime	0.25 (0.00-0.51)	-----	0.26 (0.02- 0.51)	0.23 (-0.05- 0.51)
Log of Members	0.05 (-0.01- 0.11)	0.06 (0.01- 0.12)	0.05 (-0.01- 0.11)	0.05 (-0.01- 0.12)
Violence	-0.43 (-0.71- -0.15)	-0.44 (-0.73- -0.16)	-0.43 (-0.71- -0.15)	-0.43 (-0.72- -0.15)
Log of Duration	0.05 (-0.03- 0.13)	0.05 (-0.03- 0.13)	0.05 (-0.03- 0.12)	0.05 (-0.03- 0.13)
Log of Population	-0.09 (-0.16- -0.01)	-0.09 (-0.16- -0.02)	-0.09 (-0.16- -0.01)	-0.09 (-0.16- -0.02)
Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.	0.16 (-0.25- 0.57)	0.17 (-0.24- 0.58)	0.16 (-0.25-0.57)	0.16 (-0.25- 0.57)

Direct Effects Model

Military Baseline

In the first model, military regimes are the baseline category and therefore, all of the variables are interpreted in comparison to military regimes. The coefficient for personalist regimes is statistically significant at the .05 level and operates in a positive direction. This variable performs in the expected direction compared to my theory. The marginal effects of the variable as listed in Table 2 show that personalist regimes are 25% more likely to provide the desired concessions to dissidents if the protest campaign remains nonviolent. This supports Hypothesis 4 as I proposed that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to provide the desired concessions of dissidents when faced with a nonviolent political unrest. This aligns with other studies (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008) that note authoritarian regimes may find the costs associated with the repression of nonviolent campaigns to be expensive as the actions may provoke punitive repercussions from the international community and increase domestic support for the opposition.

The violence variable is also significant but negative, suggesting that compared to military regimes, regimes facing a violent challenge are less likely to provide concessions. The marginal effects show that regimes facing a violent campaign are 43% less likely to give in to opposition reforms. This seems logical as violence targeted at the regime represents a significant challenge, which may impact the institution's survival. Therefore, the leader is unlikely to give in to the preferred reforms of the opposition. This result replicates prior literature, which proposed that authoritarian regimes are more likely to respond to violent dissident challenges with repression (Davenport, 2007b; Earl, 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Josua & Edel, 2015; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Poe et al., 1999)

Finally, the country population variable is statistically significant at the .01 level and operates in a negative direction. This suggests that the higher a country's population the less likely the regime will provide the desired

concessions of a nonviolent campaign. Specifically, the marginal effects suggest that higher population regimes are 9% less likely to give in to the reforms of a nonviolent campaign. Prior studies noted that larger populations may provoke state repression and the number of opportunities for opposition increase (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022; Carey, 2010; Chenoweth & Belgoioso, 2019, Poe et al., 1999; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021).

Personalist Baseline

In model two, I use personalist regimes as the baseline of comparison. In this model, the three variables representing the various regime types are not statistically significant. Despite this, the variable representing a violent campaign is significant and it performs in a negative direction. Similar to the previous model, this suggests that any regime facing a violent opposition is less likely to provide concessions. The marginal effects of the variable suggest that regimes facing a violent protest campaign are 44% less likely to provide the desired concessions. The violent nature of the campaign presents a substantial challenge to the leader and when faced with the prospects of losing political power, the regime leader acts to preserve her position and forgoes Similar to the model with military regimes as the baseline, the variable for population is significant and negative, which indicates faced with nonviolent challenge, a regime with a higher population is unlikely to provide the opposition with their desired concessions. The marginal effects suggest that in this scenario, the regime is 9% less likely to give in to the reforms of the protest campaign.

Single Party Baseline

In model three, the baseline of comparison is single party regimes. Similar to the model with military regimes as the baseline, the coefficient for personalist regimes is significant and positive, suggesting they are more likely to provide concessions to nonviolent campaigns. The marginal effects suggest that personalist regimes are 26% more likely to give in to the preferred reforms if the campaign remains nonviolent. This provides support for Hypothesis 4 as I proposed that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to give in to the desired reforms of a nonviolent campaign.

Like the previous two models, the variable for a violent campaign proves to be statistically significant and negative, suggesting that any regime targeted by a violent campaign is unlikely give in to any concessions to dissidents. The marginal effects indicate that any authoritarian regime facing a violent campaign is 43% less likely to provide the reforms demanded by the dissidents. The violent nature of the campaign represents a significant challenge to the leader and to preserve her position, the leader is unlikely give in to the concessions desired by the dissidents.

Finally, the variable representing the population of the country experiencing political unrest is also statistically significant and negative. This suggests that the higher a country's population, the less likely the regime leader will provide the desired concessions of the protest campaign. The marginal effects show that a regime with a higher domestic population is 9% less likely to provide the dissidents with their preferred concessions.

Monarchies Baseline

In model four, the baseline of comparison is monarchies. Similar to the personalist regimes model, the three regime type variables are not statistically significant. Despite this, the violent campaign variable remains significant and operates negatively, suggesting that when faced with a violent challenge, any authoritarian regime is unlikely to provide desired concessions. The marginal effects indicate that any regime facing a violent dissident campaign is 43% less likely to give in to the desired concessions of the dissidents.

Finally, similar to the other direct effects models, the variable representing the population of a country is significant and negative, suggesting a country with a higher population is unlikely to give in to the reforms demanded by dissidents. The results for the margin effects suggest that a country with a higher population is 9% less likely to provide the desired concessions of a nonviolent campaign.

Interactions Model

In the four models in Table 3, I test for the interactive effects of the variables of interest. In addition to the variables from the first four models, I include four new variables representing the dissident-regime interactions between an authoritarian regime type and violent dissidents. To simulate this environment, I created four interaction variables of each authoritarian regime type and a violent campaign. In introducing the interaction variables, I also retained the variables for the four regime types and a violent protest campaign in the four interaction models[7].

Table 3: Logistic Regression: Probability of Concessions to Dissidents (Interactive Effects)

[7] In the interpretation of the four interaction models, the direct effects of the four regime types and the variable representing a violent campaign are substantively meaningless. Therefore, I only report the results of the four interaction variables and the control variables.

Variable	Model 1: *Military as Baseline*	Model 2: *Personalist as Baseline*	Model 3: *Single Party as Baseline*	Model 4: *Monarchy as Baseline*
Single Party* Violence	.290 (1.03)	16.56*** (.907)	-----	16.19 *** (.989)
Military* Violence	-----	17.25*** (1.02)	1.25 (.958)	16.84*** (1.10)
Monarchy* Violence	-15.81*** (1.44)	.519 (1.46)	-15.44*** (1.43)	-----
Personalist* Violence	-15.84*** (.913)	-----	-15.54*** (.858)	-13.17*** (1.27)
Single Party Regime	-.162 (.733)	-16.78*** (.711)	-----	-15.68*** (.729)
Military Regime	-----	-17.05*** (.815)	-.562 (.703)	-15.92*** (.821)
Monarchy Regime	15.72*** (.988)	-.799 (1.14)	15.55*** (1.00)	-----
Personalist Regime	16.46*** (.684)	-----	16.35*** (.629)	14.34*** (1.21)
Log of Members	.200 (.143)	.208 (.142)	.204 (.137)	.177 (.144)
Violence	-1.44 (.840)	-18.03*** (.808)	-1.80** (.772)	-17.65*** (1.01)
Log of Duration	.189 (.179)	.226 (.206)	.208 (.185)	.228 (.189)
Log of Population	-.343** (.153)	-.335** (.148)	-.362** (.153)	-.298 (.189)
Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.	.796 (.897)	.879 (.895)	.877 (.888)	.831 (.909)
N	117	117	117	117
Goodness of Fit	0.5378	0.5892	0.5082	0.6186

(***) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level

(**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level

‡ The dependent variable of concessions is created from the *success* and *limited* outcome variables found in the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) Dataset (Chenoweth, 2011).

‡‡ Goodness of Fit test: Prob> chi2

Table 4: Marginal Effects of the Logit Models (Interactive Model)

Variable	Model 1: *Military as Baseline*	Model 2: *Personalist as Baseline*	Model 3: *Single Party as Baseline*	Model 4: *Monarchy as Baseline*
Single Party* Violence	0.04 (-0.24- 0.31)	1.37 (0.98- 1.76)	-----	0.58 (0.30- 0.87)
Military* Violence	-----	1.43 (1.03- 1.84)	0.18 (-0.09- 0.45)	0.61 (0.31- 0.91)
Monarchy* Violence	-2.16 (-2.90- -1.42)	0.05 (-0.18- 0.29)	-2.12 (-2.84- -1.40)	-----
Personalist* Violence	-2.18 (-2.83- -1.54)	-----	-2.14 (-2.76- -1.53)	-0.47 (-0.66- -0.29)
Single Party Regime	-0.02 (-0.22- 0.17)	-1.39 (-1.79- -1.00)	-----	-0.57 (-0.83- -0.30)
Military Regime	-----	-1.42 (-1.81- -1.02)	-0.08 (-0.27- 0.12)	-0.57 (-0.84- -0.30)
Monarchy Regime	2.15 (1.46- 2.84)	-0.07 (-0.25- 0.11)	2.13 (1.46- 2.81)	-----
Personalist Regime	2.27 (1.61- 2.93)	-----	2.26 (1.61- 2.91)	0.52 (0.31- 0.72)
Log of Members	0.03 (-0.01- 0.07)	0.02 (-0.01- 0.04)	0.03 (-0.01- 0.07)	0.01 (-0.01- 0.02)
Violence	-0.21 (-0.44- 0.03)	-1.50 (-1.90- -1.11)	-0.27 (-0.49- -0.04)	-0.64 (-0.94- -0.34)
Log of Duration	0.03 (-0.02- 0/08)	0.02 (-0.01- 0.05)	0.03 (-0.02- -0.09)	0.01 (-0.01- 0.02)
Log of Population	-0.05 (-0.09- -0.01)	-0.03 (-0.05- -0.00)	-0.05 (-0.10- -0.01)	-0.01 (-0.02- 0.00)
Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.	0.11 (-0.13- 0.34)	0.07 (-0.07- 0.21)	0.12 (-0.12- 0.37)	0.03 (-0.03- 0.09)

Military Baseline

In the first model of Table 3, military regimes are the baseline of comparison. The results allow observation of how regimes that require the current political arrangement perform in comparison to regimes, which can survive in a post-reform environment. The interaction term for single party regimes and violence is positive but insignificant; however, this is somewhat expected as my theory expects the two regime types (military and single party regimes) to operate in a similar fashion when faced with a violent campaign. Conversely, the variables for monarchies and personalist regimes operate in the expected manner. First, the coefficient for the interaction term for monarchies and violence is significant and negative. Table 4 lists the marginal effects for the four models, which suggests that in comparison to military regimes, monarchies are 2.16 times less likely to provide concessions to a violent challenge.

Second, personalist regimes similarly operate in an expected manner as monarchies when confronted by a violent challenge. The interaction term for personalist regimes and violence is significant and negative. According to the marginal effects, compared to military regimes, personalist regimes are 2.18 times less likely to provide

concessions when facing a violent challenge. Both findings demonstrate support for Hypothesis 3 as it implies that monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to give in to the desired concessions of violent challenges than single party and military regimes.

In this model, only one of the control variables is significant. Similar to the direct effects model, the variable for the log of population is significant and negative. The marginal effects suggest that, compared to military regimes, the larger the population of an authoritarian-led country faced with a nonviolent campaign, the regime is 5% less likely to concede to the demands of the opposition. This aligns with previous studies, which argued large populations may incite the use of state repression as the number of opportunities for dissent increase (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022; Carey, 2010; Chenoweth & Belgoioso, 2019, Poe et al., 1999; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021).

Personalist Baseline

With personalist regimes as the baseline of comparison, we examine how the regime types are expected to reform when faced with violent challenges (single party and military regimes) operate compared to regimes that require the status quo to survive (personalist). The interaction term for single party regimes and violence is significant and positive. Based on the marginal effects, single parties are 1.37 times more likely than personalist regimes to provide concessions to dissidents employing violence. Further, the interaction term for military regimes and violence operates similarly as it is also significant and positive, suggesting that military regimes are also more likely to reform if they face a violent campaign. The marginal effects show military regimes are 1.43 times more likely than personalist regimes to provide concessions to violent challenges.

These findings support Hypothesis 1. Compared to personalist regimes, both military and single party regimes are more likely to concede to protest campaign demands employing violent tactics. The decision to reform when faced with dissident violence represents a strategic maneuver by the regime leader as she weighs her options when responding to the opposition and identifies that the costs of concessions are less than those associated with repression. Further, she understands that the institution can survive in a post-reform environment either by returning to the barracks (military regimes) or by contending politically if the concessions lead to a new political infrastructure (single party regimes).

Single Party Baseline

Model three uses single party regimes as the baseline of comparison for the other regime types. The interaction term for monarchy and violence operates in the expected manner as the coefficient is significant and negative. The marginal effects suggest compared to single party regimes, monarchies are 2.12 times less likely to provide concessions to violent campaigns. Moreover, personalist regimes perform similarly when faced with violent challenges. The marginal effects show personalist regimes are 2.14 times less likely than single party regimes to concede to desired changes. Both findings provide support for Hypothesis 4 as the leaders of monarchies and personalist regimes depend on maintaining the political status quo and therefore are unlikely to give in to the preferred demands of dissidents. Monarchs and personalist leaders understand that their survival is contingent on controlling political power and remaining politically insulated from the domestic population as they are unlikely to endure a transformation of the political infrastructure.

Finally, the coefficient for the log of population is significant and negative. Similar to the military regimes model, the marginal effects suggest that compared to single party regimes, an authoritarian-led country with a large population is 5 percent less likely to provide concessions to dissidents, which aligns with previous studies (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022; Carey, 2010; Chenoweth & Belgoioso, 2019, Poe et al., 1999; Rezaee-Daryakenari, 2021).

Monarchies Baseline

The final model uses monarchies as the baseline of comparison for the other regime types. The results show that the interaction term of a single party regime type and violence is significant and positive, suggesting that a single party regime faced with a violent challenge is more likely to adopt desired reforms. Furthermore, the marginal effects infers that a single party regime facing a violent campaign is 58% more likely to provide concessions than a monarchy. Similarly, despite possessing a high proficiency in violence, military regimes are also 61% more likely to resort to reforms to quell violent dissent than monarchies. These findings support Hypothesis 1 as this suggests that single parties and military regimes are likely to operate in a similar manner by granting the preferred concessions to the dissidents using a violent campaign.

Conversely, the interaction variable for personalist regimes and violence is also significant but the coefficient is negative. This suggests that compared to monarchies, personalist regimes are less likely to provide concessions when faced with a violent challenge. The marginal effects suggest that personalist regimes are 47% less likely than monarchies to provide concessions to violent campaigns.

Conclusions

highlighted several examples of countries that encountered domestic strife during the Arab Spring to demonstrate the diversity of regime responses to civil unrest. Some autocratic regimes countered the domestic uprising with quick and overwhelming repression while others conceded to certain demands of the dissidents. While history has documented these events and prior research identified a dynamic relationship between the

belligerents, there is a theoretical gap in understanding this phenomenon. *Why do targeted regimes react to mass dissent by offering reform? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest?*

I attempt to fill this literature gap by proposing a theory to understand why some regimes give in to the desired concessions while others fail to do so. To comprehend decision-making by an authoritarian government faced with a significant challenge by dissidents, I argue we must concentrate on the interaction between two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the nature of the political unrest. First, the probability of an institution surviving in new political conditions influences the decisions by the leader as she understands the ramifications if the control of power (political, economic, and military) shifts to a domestic challenger. Although all potential regime leaders desire to maintain control of their respective government (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the structure of authoritarian regimes varies between the types of autocracies that provide certain regime leaders and their winning coalition the necessary political insulation from the mass population. The construction of certain regimes such as monarchies and personalist regimes protects the leader from domestic challenges and allows the leader to maintain her position of political power. The leader's survival depends on maintaining the political status quo as the institution cannot survive in post-reform environment. Conversely, other regime structures, such as single party regimes, do not afford their leaders this luxury as the winning coalition is larger and the government possesses minimal political insulation. Further, the structure of these regimes as well as military regimes benefits the current administration as they can endure in a post-reform environment by going back to the barracks or becoming a political challenger.

Second, the nature of the political unrest establishes the actual threat conceived by the regime. Literature on repression demonstrated that if dissidents employ violence against the regime, there is a significant probability that the regime will respond with repression against the opposition (Davenport, 1995, 2007b; Earl, 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Josua & Edel, 2015; Poe et al., 1999; Regan & Henderson, 2002). This is one of the most robust findings in the repression literature. However, it is not always consistent as not all regimes respond to dissident violence similarly and many regimes restrain nonviolent domestic protest with overwhelming violence. To understand why regimes respond to dissident challenges in a particular manner, we must observe the interaction of the nature of the political unrest and the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment.

This analysis demonstrates significant support for the proposed theory and the corresponding hypotheses. By using a direct effects model as well as an interactions model, we can examine the actions of a regime when faced with a nonviolent campaign as well as a violent protest campaign. Moreover, we benefit from using interaction terms to model the appropriate environment that the dissidents and regimes face. Finally, by altering the regime type as the baseline of comparison, we can examine the effects of specific authoritarian regime types when faced with a violent campaign in contrast to the baseline category of authoritarian regime.

As expected, military and single party regimes are more likely than monarchies and personalist regimes to provide concessions to a violent challenge. Regime leaders understand their survival does not depend on maintaining the status quo for the political infrastructure and those within the current administration can still contend for political power in a post-reform environment. Therefore, the costs and costliness of conceding to the demands of a violent opposition are lower than those associated with repression. Conversely, monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to provide concessions to violent campaigns than military and single party regimes. The administration understands that the leader's survival and the winning coalition depends on maintaining the current structure of government and if it concedes to dissident demands, this may be the first step toward the demise of the regime. Therefore, the costs and costliness of repression are lower than those associated with the decision to give in to the desired changes of the opposition.

Further, we observe the expected results for an authoritarian regime when faced with a nonviolent protest campaign. They suggest that in comparison to monarchies and personalist regimes, single party and military regimes are significantly less likely to provide the desired reforms of a nonviolent protest campaign. This speaks to the actual threat of the protest campaign and the regime's perception of the costs and costliness associated with the response. Since the dissidents do not employ violence, the regime does not perceive the unrest as threatening to their survival and thus, views repression as a less costly and more beneficial response. Moreover, I found substantial support that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to concede to protester demands if the campaign remains nonviolent. This suggests that despite the low probability of survival in post-reform environment, monarchies and personalist regimes perceive nonviolent protest campaigns as less threatening to their survival and therefore, the response of concessions may be less costly for the state. Further, the result echoes Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) proposal that repression of nonviolent protest campaigns may backfire on the regime by generating support for the dissidents and creating problems for the state internally and externally.

Finally, violence is not always the primary factor in whether a regime decides to repress violent dissidents or give in to the desired concessions of the protest campaign. In three of the models, the variable for *violence* is significant and negative, which suggests that any regime type that counters a violent challenge from a dissident campaign is unlikely to provide the preferred reforms of the opposition. This study demonstrates that certain regimes do accommodate the desires of some dissident campaigns that employ violence against the state. This suggests support for the contention that the contextual environment is important to understand as the regime

decision making is conditional on both the level of dissident threat and the probability of post-reform survival for the institution.

Data Availability

Replication data for this study is available upon request at Harvard Dataverse.

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